Qubes Canary 025

Update: The previous version of this canary contained a typographical error. “March 2020” has been corrected to “March 2021” in statement 5. The original canary, the text below, and the signatures on the canary have all been updated.

We have published Qubes Canary 025. The text of this canary is reproduced below.

Note: We have decided to make some minor formatting changes to the way Qubes Canary and Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) numbers are printed, such as dropping the ‘#’ symbol and using hyphens instead of spaces.

This canary and its accompanying signatures will always be available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).

View Qubes Canary-025 in the qubes-secpack:


Learn about the qubes-secpack, including how to obtain, verify, and read it:


View all past canaries:


                    ---===[ Qubes Canary 025 ]===---


The Qubes core developers who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:

1. The date of issue of this canary is December 8, 2020.

2. There have been 62 Qubes Security Bulletins published so far.

3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:

    427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123  F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494

4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce

5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
two weeks of March 2021. Special note should be taken if no new canary
is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without
plausible explanation.

Special announcements


Disclaimers and notes

We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently
compromised.  This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers
or services which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in
particular, software updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO

This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other
means, like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce
us to produce false declarations.

The news feeds quoted below (Proof of freshness) serves to demonstrate
that this canary could not have been created prior to the date stated.
It shows that a series of canaries was not created in advance.

This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to
anybody. None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible
for any of the statements made here.

Proof of freshness

Tue, 08 Dec 2020 16:46:42 +0000

Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
Dangerous Accusations: German Tennis Star Alexander Zverev Faces Career Turning Point
Skiing in the Pandemic: Alpine Rivalries Flare amid Resort Closures
Biden's Goal of Saving the Iran Deal Just Got Harder - A Murder and an Ultimatum
Heiko Maas: Germany's Foreign Minister on the Future of Trans-Atlantic Relations
Generation Corona: The Pandemic Is Changing Our Children's Lives for the Worse

Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
Covid-19 Live Updates: Britain Begins Vaccinating Citizens
U.K. Covid Vaccine: Side Effects, Safety, and Who Gets It First
U.S. Leaves Behind Afghan Bases — and a Legacy of Land Disputes
Covid Infections, and Blame, Rise Along Southeast Asian Borders
U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Chinese Officials Over Hong Kong Crackdown

Source: BBC News - World (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
Safety data on Pfizer jab released by US
Lloyd Austin: Biden picks ex-general as defence secretary
The man saving monkeys in the Colombian Amazon
Charlie Hebdo attack: France seeks long jail terms in Paris trial
Christchurch massacre: Inquiry finds failures ahead of attack

Source: Blockchain.info


[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this
canary in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures
on the corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]

[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures!

This is a companion discussion topic for the original entry at https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2020/12/12/canary-025/